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ABSTRACT 
 
This article develops an understanding of human rights courts as ‘norm-
brokers’. ‘Norm-brokering’ requires that courts approach the accommodation 
or rejection of alternative normative standpoints with methodological rigour. It 
is ultimately concerned with reason-giving and the quality of justification, and 
thus entails robust engagement with – rather than the mere cataloguing of – 
competing norms raised in the course of argument. The value of this exegetic 
judicial process lies in its contribution to ‘public reason’. This in turn yields 
corresponding benefits in terms of institutional legitimacy and helps confound 
legitimacy-based critiques of human rights courts. The argument is supported 
by an analysis of ten-years’ worth of European Court of Human Rights 
judgments, focusing on the ways in which external norms from the Inter-
American human rights system are relied upon (or not) by the Strasbourg Court. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Discussion of the role played by courts in the development of legal norms, indeterminate 
human rights norms in particular,1 is often closely followed by a critique of judicial ‘innovation 
and adventurism’.2 The classic argument – fundamentally sceptical about the legitimacy of 
strong judicial review of legislative action – holds that primary responsibility for the 
development of legal norms should lie squarely with democratically elected legislatures.3  
This article responds to such arguments by developing the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ to 
describe the deliberative role that human rights courts can and ought to perform when 
opportunities for norm development arise. At its core, norm-brokering entails that human rights 
courts pay greater methodological attention to how they consider alternative interpretations of 
human rights standards, drawing on normative developments from other human rights bodies. 
A judicial openness to such external norms can, we suggest, evince a commitment to ‘public 
reason’. In turn, paying careful consideration to the methods of engagement can reinforce the 
standing of human rights courts and help redress the legitimacy deficits often highlighted by 
their detractors. We argue that through an exegetic process of norm-brokering, human rights 
courts can better weather the controversies that follow from being cast as the guardians of 
human rights (and thereby provide a more resilient foundation for their protection).  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Sandholtz, ‘Expanding Rights: Norm Innovation in the European and Inter-American Courts 
of Human Rights’ in Brysk and Stohl (eds), Expanding Human Rights: 21st Century Norms and Governance 
(Edward Elgar, 2017) at 156-76. 
2 Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 67 at 71. See further, de Londras and 
Dzehtsiarou, ‘Managing Judicial Innovation in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 15 Human Rights 
Law Review 523. 
3 Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2005-06) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346. 
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We use the term ‘human rights courts’ as shorthand to describe any court or quasi-judicial 
human rights institution entrusted to resolve disputes about the scope and application of human 
rights. Our own particular case study draws upon the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights. At one level, this selection may appear ill-suited to ground a broader argument 
about judicial review and interpretive methodology. As Jeremy Waldron notes, the Strasbourg 
Court is rarely directly involved in the review of legislative action.4 Nonetheless, we suggest 
that the European Court of Human Rights provides a case par excellence in terms of the 
legitimacy struggles encountered by human rights courts more widely – in short, the 
calumnious suggestion that such courts habitually stretch the meaning of basic rights beyond 
democratically acceptable limits.5 The fact that the Strasbourg Court is a supra-national court 
only further exacerbates the legitimacy challenges it faces.6 As such, our contention is that 
norm-brokering can enhance the legitimacy of regional and international human rights courts, 
and that this argument also holds true for domestic human rights courts.7 
In the face of foundational attacks, scholars have emphasized the urgency of making ‘a 
serious case for the legitimacy of existing human rights law’.8 While these attacks may not at 
first blush concern the nuances of juridical method, any serious counter must at least address 
the sometimes opaque reasoning of human rights judgments, particularly where this relates to 
the accommodation of external normative influences.9 The way in which human rights courts 
assimilate or discount alternative normative standpoints is of critical importance to their 
perceived legitimacy. At one level, external norms present an interpretative dilemma for 
individual judges – how should these external norms be identified in the first instance, 
especially if they are themselves emerging, ambivalent or contested? In what circumstances 
should they be deemed relevant? What weight should be afforded to them, especially if they 
derive from differently worded treaty provisions? At another level, however, engagement with 
alternative normative positions provides a measure of the logical mettle and argumentative 
fortitude of the normative resolutions proposed. Thus, what may initially seem to be a narrow 
                                                 
4 Ibid. at 1353, n 20. Instead, Waldron argues, ‘much of what is done by the European Court of Human Rights is 
judicial review of executive action. Some of it is judicial review of legislative action, and some of it is actually 
judicial review of judicial action.’ 
5 Pinto-Duschinsky, ‘Bringing Rights Back Home: Making human rights compatible with parliamentary 
democracy in the UK’ (Policy Exchange, 2011) at 30, citing Raab, The Assault on Liberty (Fourth Estate, 2009) 
describing this as ‘rights contagion’. Available at: https://www.policyexchange.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/bringing-rights-back-home-feb-11.pdf [last accessed 10 October 2017]. 
6 George Letsas similarly focuses on the European Court of Human Rights ‘given lively debates in legal theory 
about the nature and legitimacy of judicial review’ and the importance of locating ‘where the European Court 
stands in these debates.’ See Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s interpretive ethic: lessons for the international lawyer’ (2010) 
European Journal of International Law 509 at 511. 
7 Colm O’Cinneide, for example, argues that similar ‘lines of attack are also beginning to be directed against 
domestic courts charged with enforcing compliance with national rights standards.’ See O’Cinneide, ‘Rights under 
Pressure’ (2017) European Human Rights Law Review 43 at 45. For discussion of transnational judicial dialogue 
about human rights in the context of domestic courts, see, in particular, McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human 
Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20(4) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 499-532.  
8 O’Cinneide, ibid. at 43.  
9 Of-course, legitimacy demands more than just methodological rigour, and other factors will also undoubtedly 
determine whether (borrowing from de Londras’s and Dzehtsiarou’s definition of ‘legitimacy’) the public have 
‘confidence that the Court will decide cases consistently, in a manner that respects the nature of both the 
Convention (as a human rights instrument) and its jurisdiction (as subsidiary and limited)’. See de Londras and 
Dzehtsiarou, supra n 2 at 526. See also Sadurski, ‘Supranational Public Reason: Part One – A Theory’ (2015) 
Sydney Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15/02 at 16, n 64. Sadurski clarifies that he is ‘not making 
a claim that the use of public reason is the only, or even necessarily the most important factor in legitimating 
supranational authorities.’ See further below at section 4A. 
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question of interpretative methodology is inextricably bound up with more fundamental 
questions concerning the legitimacy of human rights courts.10  
The focus of our argument also resonates more widely with familiar tropes of fragmentation 
and harmonisation in international law. We argue that the legitimacy of human rights courts is 
not enhanced by the pursuit of normative uniformity for its own sake, but is better served by 
rigorous, transparent and reflective consideration of relevant normative developments. In other 
words, human rights courts should at a minimum consider the case for and against 
harmonisation. The article develops the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ to describe this process, 
arguing that a robust engagement with external norms can make a net contribution to ‘public 
reason’ and thereby strengthen the normative baseline protection of human rights. Much has 
already been written on the subject of judicial dialogue.11 It is well recognized that courts 
function as an ‘interpretative community’12 in which the range of possible interpretations is 
constrained. Neither purely ‘objective’ (textual) nor purely ‘subjective’ (in the eyes of the 
judge) readings are possible, and the process of norm development demands close attention to 
questions of epistemic justification.13 In this regard, law is a fundamentally discursive process, 
and international law ‘an intersubjective enterprise’.14 The term ‘cross-judging’ has been 
coined to capture the dialogic interaction between different levels of courts – both domestic 
and international (vertical) and different regional/international courts (horizontal).15 Our 
argument builds upon these studies examining the interaction of transnational legal norms – 
what Dana Burchardt refers to as ‘substantive complementarity’: the dynamic development of 
hybrid norms whereby ‘the normative content of legal norms of one legal space is influenced, 
complemented and ultimately modified by the normative content of the norms stemming from 
another legal space.’16 The article thus seeks to contribute to the burgeoning scholarship about 
the role and methods of human rights courts in settling normative disputes, and about the 
corresponding determinants of judicial legitimacy.  
As noted, we focus, for illustrative purposes, on the European Court of Human Rights. 
Indeed, we began writing this piece in response to the specific normative question raised by 
the European Court of Human Rights’ Chamber judgment in Marguš v Croatia,17 a case 
centring on the purported impermissibility (in international law) of amnesties for grave 
violations of human rights. Given the uncertain scope of this norm, Marguš brought into sharp 
focus the underlying interpretative dilemmas at play (see further below at section 3C). It 
became clear that time and time again the Strasbourg Court is confronted with the question of 
whether, and if so how, to engage with external legal norms. Individual judges too have tried 
                                                 
10 This is supported by a quantitative analysis of the Court’s case-law by political scientist Erik Voeten. Voeten 
argues that the more scrutiny an international court faces, the more reticent it may be to borrow. His research 
showed that this was indeed the case for the European Court of Human Rights. See Voeten, ‘Borrowing and Non-
Borrowing Among International Courts’ (2010) 39 Journal of Legal Studies 547. 
11 See, for example, Slaughter, ‘Judicial Globalization’ (1999-2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 
1103. 
12 Johnstone, ‘The Power of Interpretative Communities’ in Barnett and Duvall (eds) Power in Global Governance 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) 185 at 189-90. 
13 Of particular note in this regard is William Talbott’s highly persuasive ‘equilibrium model of epistemic 
justification.’ See, Talbott, Which Rights Should be Universal? (Oxford University Press, 2005) at 29-30. 
14 Johnstone, supra n 12 at 192. See also McGuinness, ‘Medellín, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of 
International Human Rights’ (2006-7) 82 Notre Dame Law Review 755. 
15 Teitel and Howse, ‘Cross-judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order’ (2008-9) 
41 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 959; Teitel and Howse, ‘Cross-judging 
Revisited’ (2013-14) 46 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 867. 
16 Dana Burchardt, ‘Intertwinement of legal spaces in the transnational sphere’ (2017) Leiden Journal of 
International Law 305 at 324. 
17 Marguš v Croatia Application No 4455/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 November 2012. See also Marguš 
v Croatia Application No 4455/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 27 May 2014.   
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to highlight the importance of addressing precisely this methodological dilemma. In Hrvatski 
liječnički sindikat v Croatia,18 for example – a case concerning the right to strike in 
international law – Judge Pinto de Albuquerque wrote a Concurring Opinion in which he 
examined the express guarantees of a right to strike in international and regional instruments. 
He referred to a ‘methodology of legal reasoning and interpretation … which aims at the cross-
fertilization of international human rights and other fields of international law.’19 While this 
may be the ideal, as our study demonstrates (and as others have also recognized) despite there 
being ‘… a considerable degree of borrowing of concepts and jurisprudence from and between 
each of the regional bodies’, in practice this ‘is not always consistently applied and it is not 
always clear why the jurisprudence and practice of the other bodies are not acknowledged.’20 
Before illustrating these inconsistencies in approach and more fully expounding our central 
concept of ‘norm-brokering’ (section 3), it is important first to present and explain our 
methodology (section 2). We then consider the implications of this norm-brokering function 
for the roles that human rights courts play with particular reference to the concept of ‘public 
reason’ (section 4) and in conclusion, offer some thoughts on juridical methodology (section 
5). 
 
 
2. SAMPLING STRASBOURG CASE LAW: MEASURING THE TRACTION OF 
EXTERNAL NORMS  
 
The argument presented here is underpinned by systematic analysis of 70 European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) cases21 – those which, over a 10-year period from 1 January 2007 to 
31 December 2016, contain some reference to the Inter-American Commission or Court of 
Human Rights.22 Of course, focusing exclusively on references to the Inter-American system 
provides only a snapshot of the Strasbourg Court’s reliance on external norms – the actual 
number of cases in which external norms obtain some level of traction is much higher. A 
HUDOC text search for ‘Human Rights Committee’ over the same period, for example, 
generates 165 results (43 of which also appear within our sample of 70 cases).23 Clearly, 
therefore, a focus on other such external sources could generate a further study – perhaps most 
usefully, one that attempts to compare the Court’s receptivity to norms emanating from 
different sources.24 The same could be said of the temporal parameters of our sample – we have 
                                                 
18 Hrvatski liječnički sindikat v Croatia Application No 36701/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 November 
2014. 
19 Ibid. Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque at n 2. 
20 Leach, Murray and Sandoval, ‘The Duty to Investigate Right to Life Violations across Three Regional Systems: 
Harmonisation or Fragmentation of International Human Rights Law?’ in Buckley, Donald and Leach (eds) 
Towards Convergence in International Human Rights Law: Approaches of Regional and International Systems 
(Brill Nijhoff, 2016) 33 at 66-7. 
21 For the sake of readability, the cases we cite here are merely illustrative. 
22 The sample of cases relied upon was generated by a simple HUDOC text search (for ‘Inter-American’) of 
English-language judgments between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2016. This raised a dataset of 70 cases. 
23 In other words, a HUDOC search for references to the ‘Human Rights Committee’ yields 122 additional cases, 
not included within our sample of judgments referencing the ‘Inter-American’ system. In parallel, our sample of 
70 cases citing the Inter-American system includes 27 additional judgments that do not appear in the ‘Human 
Rights Committee’ results list.  
24 For key groundwork in that respect, see for example: Vanneste, General International Law Before Human 
Rights Courts – Assessing the Specialty Claims of Human Rights Law (Intersentia, 2009); Forowicz, The 
Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: Insights, Good Practices and Lessons to be Learned 
from the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 28(4) Leiden Journal of International 
Law 863. 
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not examined the further 26 cases containing some reference to the Inter-American system 
between 1975 and 2006 (though with none in the years 1976-90) since our focus here is on 
assessing the Court’s current practice rather than providing a historical account. Nevertheless, 
analysing references to the Inter-American system serves as a useful case study through which 
to explore the issue of normative transplantation and adaptation – and the circumstances in 
which the Court’s norm-brokering role can serve to enhance public reason. 
In order to assess the value of judicial engagement with external norms, our study traced 
the impact of external Inter-American norms on the development of Strasbourg jurisprudence. 
However, the figures that we cite represent best approximations. This is, in large part, because 
of the difficulty of perfectly classifying each case. It is also because some of the categories that 
we sought to tabulate (such as whether an Inter-American norm could be said to have 
emboldened the European Court’s approach) are themselves ultimately contestable and 
difficult to definitively measure.25 Furthermore, in attempting to gauge the normative impact 
of external sources on Convention jurisprudence, a HUDOC text search is a rather blunt 
instrument – capturing all cases which contain some reference, no matter how minor, to the 
Inter-American system. The Court’s way of engaging with the external Inter-American norms 
varies greatly – norms are stated with differing levels of precision and are sometimes cited only 
in passing.26 Indeed, in a small proportion of the 70 cases, the reference to the Inter-American 
system is of no normative significance whatsoever.27 We have tried to reflect this more granular 
understanding in our qualitative evaluation. 
It can also be difficult to distinguish between judgments decided primarily on factual rather 
than normative grounds (though it should also be recognized that the convincing resolution of 
factual disagreements can be just as significant in terms of enhancing ‘public reason’).28 
Moreover, in some cases, the Inter-American norm is largely peripheral to the precise question 
before the Strasbourg Court. There are also several cases in which the external norm is not 
peripheral, but which the Court nonetheless decides exclusively on the basis of its own past 
jurisprudence, Council of Europe instruments and/or comparative analysis of practice within 
Council of Europe member states. In these cases, relevant external norms might be raised only 
in the separate concurring29 or dissenting30 opinions of individual judges. Indeed, it is notable 
that of the 70 cases in the sample, references to the Inter-American system were raised in 20 
Concurring or Partly Concurring Opinions, and in 10 Dissenting or Partly Dissenting Opinions. 
                                                 
25 We have, however, counted cases where such an argument could at least plausibly have been made on the basis 
of an alignment or confluence of factors within the judgment. 
26 See, for example, the ‘the principle of customary international law’ raised by the applicants in Janowiec and 
Others v Russia Application Nos 55508/07 and 29520/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 April 2012, at para 96, 
that ‘no internal rule, even of constitutional rank, can be invoked as an excuse for non-observance of international 
law’, citing the invocation of this principle by, inter alia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
27 For example, in Volk v Slovenia Application No 62120/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 December 2012, the 
reference to the Inter-American system is merely in a footnoted book title in a Concurring Opinion. 
28 See Shadd, ‘Why the Facts Matter to Public Justification’ (2015) 27(2) Critical Review 198 – albeit focusing 
on justifications for State action through legislation (rather than justification in judicial reasoning). See also 
section 4A below for discussion of the concept of ‘public reason’. 
29 For example, in Lagutin and Others v Russia Application Nos 6228/09, 19678/07, 52340/08, 7451/09 and 
19123/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 24 April 2014, the Court (at paras 68-9) refers exclusively to Council of 
Europe instruments and comparative analysis among Council of Europe member states, whereas only the 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque joined by Judge Dedov raises Article 5 of the Inter-American 
Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) Model Regulations.  
30 For example, in Perinçek v Switzerland Application No 27510/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 17 December 
2013, two Inter-American cases are cited very briefly by the Partly Dissenting opinion of Judges Vučinić and 
Pinto de Albuquerque in relation to the inadmissibility of statutory limitations to the prosecution of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. 
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Many of these might be classed as ‘missed opportunity’ cases in which the Court could usefully 
have engaged with the external norms highlighted in the separate opinion. 31 
Further dissecting our sample of 70 cases gives rise to four preliminary observations. First, 
what is perhaps most striking is that there are 38 cases more in 2012-16 (54 cases in total) than 
in 2007-11 (16 cases in total) in which Inter-American norms are referred to – an exponential 
increase of 237%. This happened at a time when the overall number of judgments was actually 
lower than in the preceding five years.32 The most plausible explanation for this increase lies 
in the interpretative approach of individual judges. In particular, the opinions of Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque, appointed to the Court in 2011, account for 16 Concurring and six Dissenting 
Opinions (22 of the 38 cases in 2012-16). In another 13 judgments,33 a norm deriving from the 
Inter-American system was raised principally by third party interveners.34  
Second, 35 of the 70 judgments were decided by a Grand Chamber of the Court. It might 
of course have been expected that cases raising difficult normative questions and thus leading 
the Court to look beyond its own jurisprudence would be more likely to be heard by a Grand 
Chamber. However, the fact that Chamber judgments just as frequently reference external 
norms underscores the importance of ensuring methodological consistency in the Court’s 
proceedings. 
Third, in approximately 20 cases, the external norm relied upon related to purely procedural 
matters – such as the locus-standi of NGOs,35 time-barred proceedings,36 the punitive nature 
of just satisfaction,37 interim measures,38 or the question of ‘continuing violations’ and ratione 
temporis jurisdiction in disappearance cases.39 That said, it is not always straightforward to 
                                                 
31 The wider category of ‘missed opportunity’ cases – in which no attempt at all is made to draw upon potentially 
relevant extra-regional norms in either the judgment or separate opinions – is an obvious blind spot of the HUDOC 
search, one which we make no attempt to quantify. 
32 ‘The European Court of Human Rights in Facts & Figures 2016’ (March 2017) at 6, available at: 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_2016_ENG.pdf [last accessed 11 June 2017]. 
33 Opuz v Turkey Application No 33401/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 June 2009; Gäfgen v Germany 
Application No 22978/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 1 June 2010; A v Netherlands Application 
No 4900/06, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 July 2010; Bayatyan v Armenia Application No 23459/03, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 7 July 2011; El Haski v Belgium Application No 649/08, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 25 September 2012; P. and S. v Poland Application No 57375/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 30 
October 2012; El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Application No 39630/09, Merits and 
Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 13 December 2012; X and Others v Austria Application No 19010/07, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 19 February 2013; Janowiec and Others v Russia, Application Nos 
55508/07 and 29520/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 21 October 2013; Marguš v Croatia (2014) 
supra n 17; Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania Application No 47848/08, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 17 September 2014; Bouyid v Belgium Application No 23380/09, 
Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 28 September 2015; Khlaifia and Others v Italy Application No 
16483/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 15 December 2016. 
34 It is notable that the Court’s own updated research paper on ‘References to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ omits judgments where the reference to the Inter-American system is raised only in submissions to the 
Court by third party interveners. See, Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, References to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American instruments in the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (updated 1 November 2016), available at: 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_inter_american_court_ENG.pdf [last accessed 27 May 2017]. It 
would be interesting to learn whether the number of third party interventions that reference external norms is in 
fact higher than the Court’s (in-judgment) summary of these interventions indicates. 
35 Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania, supra n 33. 
36 Mocanu and Others v Romania Application Nos 10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 17 September 2014 (though this case also raises a substantive interpretive question). 
37 Cyprus v Turkey Application No 25781/94, Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 12 May 2014. 
38 Savriddin Dzurayev v Russia Application No 71386/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 April 2013. 
39 Varnava and Others v Turkey Application Nos 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90, 16070/90, 
16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 18 September 2009. 
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categorize a case as being either substantive or procedural40 – a case may focus on a substantive 
point yet reference Inter-American jurisprudence in relation to a question of procedure. Indeed, 
sometimes the invocation of Inter-American jurisprudence does not touch upon either a 
substantive or procedural right, but rather concerns a method of treaty interpretation.41 
Finally, a fourth notable aspect is that of the 70 cases, 11 could be categorized as involving 
domestic constitutional issues42 – raising questions about either the membership or powers of 
state institutions,43 the relationship between such institutions,44 access to State-held 
information45 or fundamental political rights pertaining to citizenship, voting and language.46 
A further 13 cases could be regarded as belonging to the ‘transitional jurisprudence’ of the 
Court.47 Highlighting these cases, in which questions of state sovereignty may be especially 
acute, emphasizes that the way in which external norms are handled often touches the central 
nerve of subsidiarity. As we noted at the outset, in this context the Court may face accusations 
of improper judicial activism and overreach.48 Such considerations speak directly to underlying 
questions about the Court’s role – in particular, to what degree its judgments are declaratory 
and prescriptive, whether the interpretation of the Convention should be driven teleologically 
                                                 
40 The ‘procedural’ category does not include cases concerning the interpretation of the procedural limb of a 
substantive right. So, for example, the normative obligation under Article 3 ECHR to afford access to 
comprehensive health-care services and information to victims of sexual violence is counted as a substantive 
rather than a procedural norm (P. and S. v Poland, supra n 33 at para 72 and para 160). Similarly, while Article 
13 cases focus on aspects of domestic procedure (the nature and effectiveness of domestic remedies), Article 13 
is counted as a substantive right whose scope the Court must determine. 
41 For example, Tautkus v Lithuania Application No. 29474/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 November 2012, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque. 
42 A narrower definition – embracing only, for example, what David Feldman describes as the ‘core function’ of 
a constitution (namely, the establishment of ‘institutions of the state, defining their roles and authority, and 
regulating their relationships with each other’) – yields a count of just five cases. See Feldman, ‘The Nature and 
Significance of ‘Constitutional’ Legislation’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 343 at 357. 
43 For example, Oleksandr Volkov v Ukraine Application No 21722/11, Merits, 9 January 2013 and Baka v 
Hungary Application No 20261/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 23 June 2016 (and Merits, 27 
May 2014) (removability of judges without procedural safeguards); Lagutin and Others v Russia, supra n 29 
(limits of police powers regarding special investigation techniques); Szabó and Vissy v Hungary Application No 
37138/14, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 12 January 2016 (national security, secret intelligence gathering and 
sweeping prerogative powers). 
44 For example, Lexa v Slovakia Application No 54334/00, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 23 August 2008 
(revocability of amnesties granted by the executive branch). 
45 For example, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, Application No 18030/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 
Grand Chamber, 8 November 2016 and Stoll v Switzerland Application No 69698/01, Merits, Grand Chamber, 
10 December 2007 (access to state-held information). 
46 For example, Ramadan v Malta Application No 76136/12, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 June 2016 (right to 
citizenship) and Petropavlovskis v Latvia Application No 44230/06, Merits, 13 January 2015 (right to nationality); 
Catan and Others v Republic of Moldova and Russia Application Nos 43379/04, 18454/06 and 8252/05, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 19 October 2012 (language rights); Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v 
Greece Application No 42202/07, Merits, Grand Chamber, 15 March 2012 (right to vote from abroad). 
47 For example, Aslakhanova and Others v Russia Application Nos 2944/06, 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08 and 
42509/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 December 2012; Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 39. On 
‘transitional jurisprudence’ more generally, see Teitel, ‘Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political 
Transformation’ (1997) Yale Law Journal 106; Buyse and Hamilton (eds), Transitional Jurisprudence and the 
ECHR: Justice Politics and Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
48 See, for example, the Russian Government’s assertion that ‘[t]he Court should be guided by its own case-law 
rather than the approach of the Inter-American Court’, in Catan and Others v Republic of Moldova and Russia, 
supra n 46 at para 164 (a case concerning educational policy and the use of Cyrillic rather than Latin script in 
schools within the separatist Transdniestrian region of Moldova). The Russian government’s particular sensitivity 
to external norms might also partly be explained by the fact that Russia featured as the most prominent Respondent 
State in our sample (14 cases out of 70). Croatia followed next (with 8 cases), followed then by Hungary, 
Switzerland and Turkey (each with 4).  
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or whether instead it should seek only to establish a minimal (perhaps consensus-driven) 
baseline. 
Clearly, the choice between these different approaches will reflect differences in opinion 
about the role of human rights courts, and we revisit these questions in section 4. Before doing 
so, we will first further explore the interpretative constraints that influence the methods of 
engagement by the European Court of Human Rights with conflicting normative positions – 
whether these come from within the Council of Europe space or beyond it (as in our case 
sample, from the Inter-American system). 
 
 
3. NORM-BROKERING: CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 
 
Norm development can occur in several different ways.49 These include broadening the ambit 
of an existing right,50 modifying the threshold test for finding a violation,51 supplementing the 
positive obligations attached to a right52 or extending the range of available remedies.53 The 
factors that influence how human rights courts approach this process of norm development – 
especially when confronted with normative dissensus – is the focus of this section. Drawing on 
our case study of the European Court of Human Rights, we will deal first with the triggers for 
norm-brokering, followed by the interpretative constraints that derive from the Court’s own 
established principles of interpretation. We then turn to examine the Court’s approach in cases 
where tensions have arisen between the Council of Europe’s standards and external normative 
developments beyond Europe. It is in this latter domain that the norm-brokering role of the 
Court becomes most evident. 
 
A. Triggers for Norm-Brokering  
Several triggers for norm development emerge from the jurisprudence and separate opinions 
of the European Court of Human Rights. These include: if the facts of a case present the Court 
with an opportunity to elucidate a clear normative position,54 perhaps because of a pattern of 
                                                 
49 Sandholtz, for example, identifies four different types of judicial norm development – according higher norm 
status, application to additional subjects, application to additional categories of behaviour, and creating new 
positive duties. Supra n 1, at 158. 
50 See further Baker, ‘The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: A New Conception of the ‘Ambit’ under Article 
14 ECHR’ (2006) 69(5) The Modern Law Review 714. 
51 For example, Fáber v Hungary Application No 40721/08, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 24 July 2012 (drawing 
on the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Virginia v Black 538 US 343 (2003) to establish a higher threshold 
for finding a violation of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly under Articles 10 and 11 ECHR); Also, 
Selmouni v France, Application No 25803/94, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 July 1999 (which, as Nigel Rodley 
argues, ‘manifestly adjusted downward the line between torture and inhuman treatment’). See Rodley, ‘The 
Prohibition of Torture: Absolute Means Absolute,’ (2006) 34(1) Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 
145 at 155. 
52 For example, McCann and Others v The United Kingdom Application No 18984/91, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 27 September 1995 (regarding operational planning under Article 2); Osman v The United Kingdom 
Application No. 23452/94, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 28 October 1998 (regarding preventive obligations in 
relation to acts of third parties). See also Teitel, ‘Transitional Justice and Judicial Activism – A Right to 
Accountability?’ (2015) 48 Cornell International Law Journal 385 at 396. 
53 In the realm of transitional justice for example, both the ‘right to reparations’ and the ‘right to truth’ derive from 
the well-established rights to life and the right to an effective remedy. See, for example, Buyse, ‘Lost and 
Regained? Restitution as a Remedy for Human Rights Violations in the Context of International Law’ (2008) 68 
(1) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 129. 
54 For example, in Gäfgen v Germany, supra n 33, the Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, 
Jebens Zimele, Bianku and Power (at para 2) argues that the case ‘… presented the Grand Chamber with an 
opportunity to rule upon the precise scope of the exclusionary rule in respect of any evidence obtained by a breach 
of Article 3.’ 
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persistent violations;55 if there is no directly analogous prior Convention case law,56 or indeed, 
if there had been significant criticism of previous judgments;57 ‘uncertainty’58 or ‘apparent 
conflict’59 in the Court’s own jurisprudence thus requiring ‘further clarification’, perhaps 
following from an earlier failure by the Court to provide a clear and defined standard for 
national authorities to comply with;60 a broader concern to bring coherence to ‘the Court’s 
messy case-law’;61 the need to promote internal consistency and harmony between the 
Convention’s various provisions62 (noting that ‘the Convention and its Protocols must be read 
as a whole’); and more generally, providing ‘legal certainty in international law’.63  
The Court has also sometimes been guided by teleological principles such as ‘the principle 
of effectiveness’,64 of the most protective interpretation65 or the requirements of the rule of 
law.66 Yet even where these triggers are present, the Court is constrained by its own established 
rules of interpretation. 
 
B. Principles of Interpretation 
Citing Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Strasbourg Court 
has held that ‘[t]he Convention and its Protocols cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must 
be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law of which they form 
part’.67 This includes ‘“any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
                                                 
55 Lagutin and Others v Russia, supra n 29. Here, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque argued that ‘[i]n view of the 
systemic failure of the Russian legal order … the time was ripe for the Court to establish the requirements of 
Convention-compliant legislation on special investigation techniques.’ 
56 In Palomo Sánchez and Others v Spain Application Nos 28955/06, 28957/06, 28959/06 and 28964/06, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 12 September 2011, the dissenting judges (at para 7) note that ‘there has 
not yet been any specific Convention case-law associating trade-union freedom … with freedom of expression’. 
See also, Bayatyan v Armenia, supra n 33 at para 99 (concerning the applicability of Article 9 to conscientious 
objectors). 
57 For example, in Öcalan v Turkey (No. 2) Application Nos 24069/03, 197/04, 6201/06 and 10464/07, Merits and 
Just Satisfaction, 18 March 2014, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (at para 1 of his Partly Dissenting Opinion) argued 
that ‘[i]n view of the reaction to Vinter, the Court could and should have taken the opportunity to clarify the 
meaning of its standard in this matter.’ See also the argument raised by the International Federation for Human 
Rights (FIDH) intervening in the Armenian Genocide denial case of Perinçek v Switzerland, supra n 30 at para 
189. 
58 Janowiec and Others v Russia, supra n 33 at para 140. 
59 Šilih v Slovenia Application No 71463/01, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 9 April 2009, Joint 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza and Türmen. 
60 El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, supra n 33, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque.  
61 Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v Malta Application Nos 25794/13 and 28151/13, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 22 November 2016, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque at para 33, 
arguing for the need to align the Court’s position ‘with international human-rights and refugee law’ (in relation to 
the interpretation of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR). 
62 Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17 at para 128. 
63 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary Application No 18030/11, supra n 45 at para 150 (access to state-held 
information). Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vučinić, makes a similar point in his Concurring 
Opinion in Maktouf and Damjanović v Bosnia and Herzegovina Application Nos 2312/08 34179/08, Merits and 
Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 18 July 2013 (emergence of domestic violence as an autonomous human rights 
violation). 
64 Milenković v Serbia, supra n 69. 
65 Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania, supra n 33, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque at para 8. 
66 Baka v Hungary, supra n 43 at paras 117 and 121. 
67 Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17 at para 129. See also Loizidou v Turkey Application No 15318/89, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 18 December 1996, at para 43. Burchardt argues that Article 31(3)(c) 
‘stipulates an obligation of inter-systemic interpretation.’ See Burchardt, supra n 16 at 316. 
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between the parties”, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of 
human rights …’68  
While the Court has noted that the Convention, like other international treaties, ‘must be 
construed in the light of their object and purpose’,69 it has adopted a number of interpretative 
principles enabling the Protean development of human rights norms. The Court has frequently 
emphasized that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in 
previous cases.70 On the other hand, it has emphasized the imperative of ‘evolutive 
interpretation’.71 This means that the Convention is to be viewed as a ‘living instrument’ to be 
‘interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’.72 The Strasbourg Court has thus held that it 
must ‘have regard to the changing conditions in the respondent State and in the Contracting 
States in general and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to 
be achieved.’73 From our sample, evolutive development of a Strasbourg norm was expressly 
acknowledged in six cases (though it is debatable whether or not these cases perfectly 
exemplify evolutive interpretation),74 and an evolutive approach was explicitly rejected due to 
a lack of consensus in four cases (concerning the pension entitlements of surviving unmarried 
partners,75 the use of human embryos for scientific research,76 same-sex adoption77 and voting 
from abroad).78 
These modes of interpretation delimit the menu for the Court in performing its norm-
brokering role. However, notwithstanding the articulation of these interpretative principles, the 
Court has sometimes struggled – in methodological terms – to resolve acute normative 
dilemmas. Indeed, the methodology used to ascertain whether a European consensus exists is 
not elaborated upon in the Rules of Court,79 and has sometimes caused significant internal 
                                                 
68 Marguš, ibid. 
69 See, for example, Milenković v Serbia Application No 50124/13, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 1 March 2016, 
at para 80, citing Mamatkulov and Askaraov v Turkey Application Nos 46827/99 and 46951/99, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 4 February 2005, Grand Chamber, at para 123. 
70 For example, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, supra 45 at para 150. 
71 It is noteworthy, given the focus of this article on emerging norms, that the concept of ‘evolutive interpretation’ 
first appeared in Strasbourg jurisprudence in dissenting opinions: see Albert and Le Compte v Belgium, 
Application Nos 7299/75 and 7496/76, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 10 February 1983, Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Matscher; Öztürk v Germany Application No 8544/79, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 February 1984, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bernhardt. 
72 Tyrer v The United Kingdom Application No 5856/72, Merits, 25 April 1978, at para 31; Neuman, ‘Import, 
Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(1) European Journal of 
International Law 101 at 106. 
73 For example, Scoppola v Italy (No.2) Application No 10249/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 
17 September 2009, at para 104 (emphasis added). 
74 Khlaifia and Others v Italy, supra n 33 (collective expulsion of Aliens, Article 4 of Protocol 4 ECHR); Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, supra n 45 (access to state-held information, Article 10); Konstantin Markin v 
Russia Application No 30078/06, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 22 March 2012 (parental leave 
for fathers, Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR); Bayatyan v Armenia, supra n 33 (conscientious 
objection, decoupling Article 9 from Article 4(3)(b) ECHR); Scoppola v Italy (No.2), ibid. (Article 7 ECHR to 
include lex mitior principle as well as non-retrospectivity – but note the partly dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Nicolaou, joined by Judges Bratza, Lorenzen, Jočienė, Villiger and Sajó); Šilih v Slovenia, supra n 59 (evolution 
of the procedural obligation under Article 2 ECHR into a separate and autonomous duty). 
75 Aldeguer Tomás v Spain Application No 35214/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 14 June 2016, at para 82.  
76 Parrillo v Italy Application No 46470/11, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 27 August 2015, at 
para 69. 
77 X and Others v Austria, supra n 33 at para 149; cf. Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Casadevall, 
Ziemele, Kovler, Jočienė, Šikuta, De Gaetano and Sicilianos. 
78 Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece, supra n 46 at para 74. 
79 Registry of the Court, ‘Rules of Court’, 14 November 2016. Available at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf [last accessed 3 July 2017]. 
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disagreement within the Court.80 Thus, even the Court’s own principles of interpretation do not 
always convincingly explain or resolve normative tensions within the Council of Europe space 
– and the methodology employed by the Court when considering the question of ‘consensus’ 
is far from failsafe.  
It is precisely for this reason – the inability of bare interpretative principles to formulaically 
yield persuasive normative outcomes – that we propose the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ as an 
appeal to ‘public reason’ (explained further in Sections 3D and 4A below). As Fred Frohock 
notes, ‘the verbal firepower of good arguments’ is one of ‘the dominant modes of public 
reasoning when consensus is not effective’.81 Indeed, the limits of a consensus driven approach 
– and thus the need to find an alternative basis for grounding strong rights protections – are 
heightened, as Sandholtz suggests, ‘when the majority of states are rights laggards.’82 Norm-
brokering compels the Court to expressly confront and methodically address normative 
challenges as they arise. As has been noted, these challenges may arise within the Council of 
Europe space (whereupon the Court must mediate between different national and regional 
normative standpoints), but it is the external dimension of the norm-brokering role that is 
especially significant (since recourse to external norms more obviously raises questions of 
jurisdictional overreach and hence, also of legitimacy). 
 
C. Accommodating External Norms 
Letsas argues that ‘the “openness” of regional instruments to other parts of international law is 
not a choice, a process, or a recent development. It is a necessary consequence of the fact that 
the adjudicative task of international courts and other bodies is one of moral evaluation, not 
one of textual interpretation.’83 Whether or not one accepts Letsas’s thesis in its entirety, we 
are interested here in how human rights courts explain or do not explain their reliance on these 
other parts of international law.  
The findings of our own study demonstrate that the manner in which the Strasbourg Court 
engages with the Inter-American norms varies significantly. In 13 judgments,84 the Inter-
American system was referenced by the Court only in its listing of relevant international norms 
but was not referred to in the ‘Court’s assessment’ of the case before it. In just 18 of the 70 
cases, the Court’s assessment does engage with the external Inter-American norm (sometimes 
even just minimally so).85 In judgments where the Inter-American norms do inform a more 
robust evaluation of the merits, on at least two occasions the external norm was expressly 
rejected86 and in up to five judgments, simply not followed. For example, the Court’s judgment 
                                                 
80 In X and Others v Austria, supra n 33, for example, a case concerning the extension of second-parent adoption 
rights to same-sex couples (under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 ECHR), there was disagreement 
regarding the ‘sample’ of member States to be taken into account – see paras 78 and 149 and the Joint Partly 
Dissenting Opinion of Judges Casadevall, Ziemele, Kovler, Jočienė, Šikuta, De Gaetano and Sicilianos at paras 
13 and 15. In Sitaropoulos and Giakoumopoulos v Greece, supra n 46, there was disagreement about the 
interpretation of the results of a comparative study of 33 Council of Europe Member States (namely, whether or 
not a European consensus on allowing nationals to vote from abroad could be said to exist, under Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR) – see paras 49 and 74. 
81 Frohock, Public Reason: Mediated Authority in the Liberal State (Cornell University Press, 1999) at 223.  
82 Sandholtz, supra n 1 at 160.  
83 Letsas, supra n 6 at 541. Letsas further argues (at 540) that ‘the purpose of human rights courts … is to discover, 
over time and through persuasive moral argument, the moral truth about these fundamental rights’, and indeed (at 
538) that the Strasbourg Court has adopted an ‘interpretative ethic’ which rejects originalism and instead 
‘prioritizes the moral reading of the Convention rights’. 
84 For example, Lexa v Slovakia, supra n 44. 
85 For example, the reference to the Inter-American Court’s interpretation of the right to freedom of expression as 
including the right to seek information in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, supra n 45 at para 146. 
86 For example, in Janowiec and Others v Russia, supra n 33 the Grand Chamber rejected the argument advanced 
by the 3rd party intervenors (Amnesty International, Open Society Justice Initiative, Memorial, the European 
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in Aldeguer Tomás v Spain87 (concerning the pension rights of surviving, unmarried, same-sex 
partners) does not follow the less deferential approach of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in relation to a matter of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Instead, the 
Strasbourg Court afforded a wide margin of appreciation to Spain in relation to the delayed 
introduction of legislative changes in this area – an area that the Court emphasized was 
concerned with ‘evolving rights with no established consensus’ (and also ‘general economic or 
social measures’ in relation to which a wide margin is usually allowed).88  
In 14 of the 70 cases, it is at least arguable that the Inter-American norm somehow 
emboldens the European Court of Human Rights to adopt or affirm a more expansive 
interpretation of a Convention right.89 For example, in relation to enforced disappearances, the 
willingness of the Inter-American Court to find violations of, amongst other provisions, Article 
8 ACHR (fair trial) could be said to have emboldened the Strasbourg Court in affirming 
autonomous procedural obligations in the absence of a proven substantive breach.90 However, 
even within a single case, the same external norm can be relied upon in different ways by 
different judges – the salience of the external norm is entirely contingent on how the case is 
framed (with the same norm being central to some lines of argument and largely peripheral to 
others). This underscores the importance of the Court clarifying how precisely the external 
norm is being relied upon. In Marguš v Croatia,91 for example, the Inter-American norm 
(relating to the impermissibility of amnesties, and itself contested) was invoked by different 
judges to address a mixture of different factual and normative questions. These questions 
centred on the applicability and/or application of the non bis in idem rule under Article 4 of the 
Seventh Protocol to the Convention.92 Likewise, the admissibility ratione materiae of the 
Article 6 complaint in Baka v Hungary93 – specifically, the applicability of the civil head of 
Article 6 to a dispute concerning a person exercising a public function – illustrates the challenge 
of teasing apart what is normative and what is factual.94 The Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Sicilianos in Baka pays close attention to the external materials referred to at different junctures 
                                                 
Human Rights Advocacy Centre and the Transitional Justice Network) who relied on Inter-American cases to 
assert that the investigative obligations under Article 2 persisted ‘for as long as it was practically feasible’ and 
that it was ‘existing practice of national and international courts to assert jurisdiction over past violations’. 
87 Aldeguer Tomás, supra n 75. 
88 Ibid. at paras 90 and 82. 
89 In approximately 25 of the 70 cases, it could be argued that the Council of Europe norm was already congruent 
with the particular Inter-American norm raised. For example, P. and S. v Poland Application No 57375/08, Merits 
and Just Satisfaction, 30 October 2012 (concerning the question of whether a lack of access to healthcare was 
germane to the Article 3 ECHR threshold). Here, the Court relied (at para 160) only on its own prior case law, 
without referring back to the arguments raised by Amnesty International (at para 72). 
90 See, Varnava and Others v Turkey, supra n 39 and subsequently Aslakhanova and Others v Russia, supra n 47. 
Indeed, by also finding a violation of the right to life under Article 2 ECHR, the Strasbourg Court could be said 
to have gone further than the Inter-American jurisprudence (which did not find of a violation of the right to life 
under Article 4 ACHR). Another example is provided by Opuz v Turkey, supra n 33 at paras 190-1, in which Inter-
American case-law was referred to in order to establish the meaning of discrimination in the context of domestic 
violence, thereby helping ground a finding of a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. 
91 Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17.  
92 These different questions related to the applicability of Protocol 7-4 to the facts of the case; the applicability of 
Protocol 7-4 to amnesties per se; the application of Protocol 7-4 to different types of amnesty; the interpretation 
of Protocol 7-4 in light of the investigative obligations under Articles 2 and 3; and the application of Protocol 7-
4 retrospectively given the evolution of international standards relating to amnesties. For Judges Ziemele, Berro-
Lefèvre and Karakaş and for Judge Vučinić, the Inter-American norm was relevant (albeit for slightly different 
reasons), whereas it was peripheral to the arguments advanced by Judges Spielmann, Power-Forde and Nussberger 
and by Judges Šikuta, Wojtyczek and Vehabović. 
93 Baka v Hungary, supra n 43. In this case, a Chamber judgment (unanimously) and Grand Chamber judgment 
(by a 15-2 majority) held that the dismissal of the President of the Hungarian Supreme Court, without due process 
guarantees, engaged and violated both Article 6 and Article 10 ECHR. 
94 See also Shadd, supra n 28. 
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in the majority opinion, and expressly poses the normative question: ‘Towards a subjective 
right to judicial independence, protected by the Convention?’ In contrast, the majority drew 
upon both Council of Europe and external sources to answer a factual question about the 
existence of an express right for court executives of access to a court in Hungarian law, 
concluding that ‘judicial protection was available under domestic law for cases of dismissal’ 
in line with these standards and the principle of the rule of law.95 
Three different issues relating to the accommodation of external norms emerge from the 
cases in our sample. The primary question concerns the weight properly to be attached to 
external norms, and whether harmonization of international law should necessarily be pursued. 
The second relates to how to navigate differences arising from differently worded treaty 
provisions (when the very rights protected by the European Convention and other treaties are 
differently framed). The third is the difficulty of establishing what exactly international law, 
beyond the Council of Europe, has to say on a particular normative point. We will deal here 
with each of these three issues in turn – but it is significant to observe again96 that Rule 74 of 
the Rules of Court (on the ‘Contents of the Judgment’) is entirely silent on how international 
materials ought to be drawn upon or reflected in the Court’s reasoning.97 Instead, this is 
apparently left entirely to judicial discretion – and too often the Court merely lists relevant 
international norms without making any further attempt to articulate their significance or 
explain how, if at all, they have been taken into account. 
Let us turn to the first question. Where an external norm is deemed relevant to a particular 
case, the question of what weight ought to be attached to it may be thought to depend on the 
provenance of the norm concerned – perhaps because of salient contextual similarities or its 
standing within orthodox scholarship. The approach to external norms is certainly not uniform, 
even considering only the cases in which the Court expressly acknowledged the evolutive 
development of Convention rights. For example, in Šilih v Slovenia,98 while the Grand 
Chamber found that the procedural obligation to carry out an investigation into deaths under 
Article 2 had evolved in its own case-law into a separate and autonomous duty, it then noted 
that: ‘[t]his approach finds support also in the jurisprudence of the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee and, in particular, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights …’99 In 
Bayatyan v Armenia,100 however, while external norms may have had some role in catalysing 
the normative shift in the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence relating to conscientious objection 
(the decoupling of Art 9 and Art 4(3)(b)), it was certainly not the jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Commission or Court that galvanized the European Court’s approach. After all, the 
Inter-American jurisprudence itself expressly drew upon and reflected the earlier position of 
the European Commission on Human Rights, confirming that ‘conscientious objection was 
protected under the American Convention only in countries where it was recognized’.101 In 
Bayatyan, the norm was revised because of a combination of developments within both the EU 
                                                 
95 Supra n 43 (Grand Chamber) at paras 114 (emphasis added) and 117. This factual assertion prompted Judges 
Pinto de Albuquerque and Dedov to enter a concurring opinion, suggesting overreach (at para 1) on the part of 
the majority: ‘The Court found this right of access to be a given by reading into the domestic law the international 
standards on judicial independence, which are – for the most part – soft law.’ 
96 See above at section 3B. 
97 Registry of the Court, supra n 79. 
98 Šilih v Slovenia, supra n 59. 
99 Ibid. at para 160. 
100 Bayatyan v Armenia, supra n 33. 
101 Ibid. at para 68 (emphasis added). 
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and Council of Europe102 and the UN Human Rights Committee’s interpretation of Articles 8 
and 18 ICCPR.103 
The weight to be attached to external norms also depends on whether the desired goal is 
one of harmonization and achieving uniformity in international law. In one case from our 
sample, Zolotukhin v Russia,104 the Court adopted a novel approach in its assessment of the 
merits of the case. The Court undertook a structured, two-step process organised under the 
following subheadings: ‘Summary of the existing approaches’105 and ‘Harmonisation of the 
approach to be taken’.106 Only in two other cases does the Strasbourg Court expressly follow a 
similar approach – but both of these are concerned with the harmonization of internal, rather 
than external, norms.107 Significantly, Zolotukhin is a Grand Chamber judgment which 
ultimately provided the normative clarification that differently constituted Chambers were 
subsequently able to follow.108 Our thesis is that addressing the question of harmonization 
(rather than having harmonization as a goal) is a methodological approach that human rights 
courts could adopt when considering the weight to be attached to external norms. The goal will 
certainly not always be uniformity or harmonization as in Zolotukhin, but rather as others have 
suggested ‘textured harmony’109 or reasoned and ‘thoughtful convergence’.110 
Second, and relatedly, the issue of what normative import can properly be drawn from 
Inter-American jurisprudence deriving from differently worded treaty provisions has led the 
European Court to afford more in-depth – or at least, more explicit – consideration of external 
norms than it might otherwise do in cases involving entirely congruent treaty provisions. This 
may be because, as Jamie Mayerfeld notes, ‘[d]ifferences in the way particular treaties and 
constitutions define human rights force us to evaluate and compare. Why is this human right 
defined differently here than there? Which definition is better and why?’111 In Petropavlovskis 
v Latvia,112 for example, the applicant’s attempt to rely on Inter-American jurisprudence in 
relation to the naturalization of Stateless persons was rejected by the Court as inadmissible. 
The Court explained that: 
 
                                                 
102 Specifically, Article 10, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly 
and of the Committee of Ministers. 
103 Bayatyan v Armenia, supra n 33 at paras 54-5 and 105-8. 
104 Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia Application No 14939/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 10 
February 2009. 
105 Ibid. at paras 70-7. 
106 Ibid. at paras 78-84 (followed then by ‘Application of this approach to the present case’). 
107 See, Roman Zakharov v Russia, Application No 47143/06, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 4 
December 2015 (concerning actio popularis and the question of determining victim status in surveillance cases), 
at para 170; and Idalov v Russia, Application No 5826/03, Merits and Just Satisfaction,  Grand Chamber, 22 May 
2012, at para 127 (reconciling two different approaches to the application of the six-month rule in assessing the 
reasonableness of the duration of pre-trial detention ‘so that a uniform and foreseeable approach may be adopted 
in all cases, thus better serving the requirements of justice’). 
108 Maresti v Croatia Application No 33401/02 and 55759/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 June 2009 (first 
section); Tomasovic v Croatia Application No 53785/09, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18 October 2011 (first 
section); and Milenković v Serbia, supra n 69 (third section).  
109 Evans, ‘Co-existence and Confidentiality: The Experience of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture; Harmony and Human Rights: The Music of the Spheres’ in Buckley, Donald and Leach (eds), supra n 
20, 516 at 542. See generally, Cheeseman, ‘Harmonising the Jurisprudence of Regional and International Human 
Rights Bodies: A Literature Review’, Appendix in Buckley, Donald and Leach (eds), supra n 20.  
110 Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107(2) Yale Law 
Journal 273 at 374. 
111 Mayerfeld, The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
International Law (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016) at 209.  
112 Petropavlovskis v Latvia, supra n 46. 
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… a “right to nationality” similar to that in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, or a right to acquire or retain a particular nationality, is not guaranteed 
by the Convention or its Protocols … The applicant’s reference to the case-law of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights is … misguided, since the American 
Convention on Human Rights, which is a regional instrument, explicitly provides for a 
right to nationality in its Article 20. 
 
Of-course, the Strasbourg Court need not reject such normative arguments absolutely, and may 
decide to distinguish its own jurisprudence in other ways. In El Haski v Belgium,113 for 
example, the relevant Inter-American treaty provision was Article 10 of the Inter-American 
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. This provision excludes evidence obtained by 
torture ‘in a legal proceeding’, but the Strasbourg Court in El Haski, relying on its own prior 
case law (Gäfgen), adopted a more nuanced approach that further holds: (a) admission of 
evidence obtained in breach of Article 3, however classified, will render any criminal trial 
unfair in breach of Art 6; and (b) admission of evidence obtained as a result of inhuman 
treatment that falls short of torture will render non-criminal cases unfair in breach of Article 6 
if the breach of Article 3 is shown to have a bearing on the outcome of the case.  
All the cases discussed in this section so far – Zolotukhin, Petropavlovskis and El Haski – 
demonstrate that the European Court has on occasion been willing to enter into a deliberative 
process with a view to carefully explaining how external norms might or might not be 
appropriately weighted and applied. However, the Court does not always engage so admirably.  
A third element of tension concerning the Court’s recognition of external norms illustrates 
the point. In the case of Marguš v Croatia,114 the external norm was itself a matter of 
contestation, and the Court was evidently less willing to enter into a process of norm-brokering. 
The gap between the Court’s approach in this case and in the cases discussed above underscores 
the need for more reasoned judicial engagement with relevant external norms and greater 
methodological consistency in doing so. 
Fred Marguš, a decorated commander in the Croatian Army, was prosecuted in December 
1991 for the murder of two Serbian civilians. He later benefitted from an amnesty enacted by 
the Croatian government in 1996.115 However, when he was retried in 2007, he claimed that he 
had been tried twice for the same crime, in contravention of Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR – 
the double jeopardy, ne bis in idem principle.116 In both the domestic proceedings and later 
before the European Court, the government argued that the Amnesty Act had been applied 
contrary to its purpose, and thus contrary to Croatia’s obligations under the Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention. Both the Chamber and Grand Chamber broadly agreed, merely concluding 
that since the Croatian authorities were acting in compliance with their investigative 
obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, Article 4 of Protocol 7 was not applicable. 
However, setting aside the Grand Chamber’s rather perfunctory conclusion, it is the Court’s 
lengthy documenting of external norms concerning the status of amnesties under international 
law that is particularly relevant here in terms of norm-brokering. The Chamber of the Court 
had stated that: 
 
                                                 
113 El Haski v Belgium, supra n 33. The case also provides a good example of a dialogic approach in light of 
arguments advanced in the case law of national courts (including the UK House of Lords judgment in A and 
Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (no. 2) [2005] UKHL 71, and the German and Canadian 
case-law cited by UK government). 
114 Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17. 
115 Ibid. at para 16. 
116 The applicant also argued that his fair trial rights under Article 6 ECHR had been violated, but neither the 
Chamber nor Grand Chamber found Article 6 to have been violated. 
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Granting amnesty in respect of “international crimes” – which include crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide – is increasingly considered to be 
prohibited by international law. The understanding is drawn from customary rules 
of international humanitarian law, human rights treaties, as well as the decisions of 
international and regional courts and developing State practice, as there has been a 
growing tendency for international, regional and national courts to overturn general 
amnesties enacted by governments.117 
 
However, as many scholars have observed, the issue of amnesties is one where the international 
norm remains deeply contested.118 Pensky, for example, notes that anti-amnesty arguments 
‘have seriously overestimated what current international law has to say about the status of 
domestic amnesties for international crimes’.119 Mallinder has similarly noted that ‘it is too 
early to say that an absolute prohibition on amnesties for crimes under customary international 
law exists: it is lex ferenda’.120 It was on this basis that a third-party intervention from a number 
of academics argued that ‘strong policy reasons supported acknowledging the possibility of the 
granting of amnesties where they represented the only way out of violent dictatorships and 
interminable conflicts.’121 The interveners pleaded against a total ban on amnesties and for a 
more nuanced approach in addressing the issue of granting amnesties.  
Only Judges Šikuta, Wojtyczek, and Vehabović in their Joint Concurring Opinion 
expressly recognized the key epistemological difficulty: namely, the challenge of establishing 
what rules of international law were applicable ‘in the past at a particular juncture or over a 
specific period’. The challenge presented was twofold: it involved first identifying the relevant 
international law norm, and second, assessing its ‘fit’ with the evolutive jurisprudence of the 
Strasbourg Court. But the Court does not follow such a structured approach. Instead, much of 
the Grand Chamber ruling in Marguš is taken up by documenting the judgments of other (non-
European) regional and international courts and tribunals. In fact, of the 58 pages of the 
judgment (not counting the five separate opinions),122 24 pages are devoted to ‘Relevant 
                                                 
117 Marguš v Croatia (2012), supra n 17 at para 74. See also Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17 at para 130. 
118 Indeed, as recently as 2012, the European Court of Human Rights itself held that: ‘even in such fundamental 
areas of the protection of human rights as the right to life, the State is justified in enacting any amnesty laws it 
might consider necessary’. See Tarbuk v Croatia Application No 31360/10, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 11 
December 2012, at para 50 (citing an earlier admissibility decision of the Commission in Dujardin and Others v 
France Application No 16734/90, Commission Decision, 2 September 1991 at 243). 
119 Pensky, ‘Jus Post Bellum and Amnesties’ in May and Edenberg (eds) Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 152 at 161. 
120 In other words, ‘future law’. See Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the 
Peace and Justice Divide (Hart, 2008) at 9. 
121 See, ‘Legal Status of Amnesty: Third party intervention in the case of Marguš v Croatia, Application no. 
4455/10’. The authors are grateful to Professor William Schabas and Dr Josepha Close for sharing with us the full 
text of this intervention (as summarized in Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17 at paras 108-113). 
122 There are four separate concurring or joint concurring, and one partly dissenting, opinions. The joint concurring 
opinion of Judges Spielmann, Power-Forde and Nussberger relied on a textual analysis of Article 4 of Protocol 7, 
arguing that this provision was simply not applicable since the amnesty did not constitute a ‘final acquittal’ 
(because there had been no assessment by a court of the circumstances of the case, and the guilt or innocence of 
the defendant had never been established). Another joint concurring opinion (of Judges Ziemele, Berro-Lefevre 
and Karakaş) argued instead – contrary to the third-party intervention to which they do not refer – that ‘given the 
importance of combating any perception of impunity for grave breaches of human rights or for war crimes, we 
would have preferred to say that the ne bis in idem principle … should not operate as a barrier to bringing 
individuals to justice where those individual have been granted amnesty shielding them from responsibility …’ 
In this way, they argued, the Court would have contributed to a better understanding of the scope of Article 4 of 
Protocol 7. 
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International Law Materials’.123 While these references to external norms of international law 
might have assisted the Court in divining the ‘Conventional’ approach to amnesties for serious 
violations of human rights, they play a relatively minor role in the Court’s reasoning.  
The Grand Chamber simply ‘notes’ inter alia and without further comment: (a) the 
possibility that treaty obligations may circumscribe the possibility of amnesties being granted 
in respect of grave breaches of human rights;124 (b) that ‘[v]arious international bodies have 
issued resolutions, recommendations and comments … generally agreeing that amnesties 
should not be granted’ in such circumstances;125 (c) ‘the interveners’ argument that there is no 
agreement among States at the international level when it comes to a ban on granting amnesties 
without exception for grave breaches of fundamental human rights, including those covered by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention’;126 and (d) the relevant jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights.127 The Grand Chamber’s conclusion recognizes ‘a growing tendency 
in international law to see such amnesties as unacceptable’, but does not decide whether the 
international norm is, or ought to be, firmly settled so as to permit amnesty for grave violations 
of human rights in certain circumstances (such as in the context of ‘a reconciliation process 
and/or a form of compensation to the victims’) since there were no such circumstances in the 
present case.128 This is essentially a consensus-driven approach, albeit here on a global extra-
Conventional scale. 
Indeed, only the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Šikuta, Wojtyczek, and Vehabović 
makes some attempt to consider the ‘meaning’ of these various treaty-based and external 
judicial pronouncements. Referring to the leading judgments under the Inter-American system, 
the Concurring Opinion notes that ‘the solutions adopted under that system are not necessarily 
transposable to other regional human rights protections systems’ since it ‘has a number of 
distinctive features.’129 In an argument that resonates with Evans’s call for ‘textured harmony’ 
rather than uniformity, whilst noting the rapid evolution of international law, the Joint 
Concurring Opinion concludes that: 
 
[W]orld history teaches us the need to observe the utmost caution and humility in this 
sphere. Different countries have devised widely varying approaches enabling them to 
put grave human rights violations behind them and restore democracy and the rule of 
law’.130  
 
The joint concurring opinion thus places ECHR norms in a broader global context, while at the 
same time arguing that differentiation may sometimes be called for. This kind of argumentation 
is an explicit example of norm-brokering.  
 
D. Norm-Brokering 
                                                 
123 This in itself might point to the Court’s normative ambition since, as noted previously, the facts of the case did 
not require the Strasbourg Court to pronounce on the legality, or otherwise, of amnesties. The domestic failing 
was less the recourse to amnesty, and more the miscategorisation of Fred Marguš’s crimes by the domestic courts.  
124 Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17 at para 132. 
125 Ibid. at para 134. 
126 Ibid. at para 137. 
127 Ibid. at para 138. 
128 Ibid. at para 139: ‘Even if it were to be accepted that amnesties are possible where there are some particular 
circumstances, such as a reconciliation process and/or a form of compensation to the victims, the amnesty granted 
to the applicant in the instant case would still not be acceptable since there is nothing to indicate that there were 
any such circumstances’ (emphasis added). 
129 Ibid. Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Šikuta, Wojtyczek, and Vehabović at para 7. 
130 As such, they could not ‘rule out the possibility that ... an amnesty [for grave human rights violations] might 
in some instances serve as a tool enabling an armed conflict or a political regime that violates human rights to be 
brought to an end more swiftly, thereby preventing further violations in the future.’ Ibid. at para 9. 
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The way in which human rights courts attempt to resolve issues of treaty interpretation, in the 
face of normative divergence both within and beyond their jurisdictional boundaries, 
illuminates the role of human rights courts in mediating between competing internal and 
external norms. Our thesis is that the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ helpfully captures the role 
that human rights courts ought to undertake. As a concept, however, ‘norm-brokering’ has 
received relatively little scholarly analysis.  
The concept of ‘norm-brokering’ has been used by Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G Weiss 
to describe the role of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in 
reconciling the tension between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention through the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ norm.131 Philipp Pattberg uses it to describe the role of the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) in mediating norms between multiple stakeholders, such as experts 
and practitioners. This is a role which he distinguishes from the FSC’s standard-setting 
function, describing it in terms of the production and dissemination of knowledge (‘including 
knowledge from other sources such as international organisations’ and ‘providing an arena for 
learning’).132 Otherwise, however, there has been no attempt to carve out or interrogate what a 
judicial norm-brokering role might entail.133  
We argue that norm-brokering, as a method of human rights interpretation, implies active 
engagement with contextual factors both beyond and within the particular region concerned. It 
is a granular and exegetic process, one that demands close engagement with legal texts and 
their respective origins. ‘Brokerage’ is much more than the inert or indifferent supply and 
reception of norms. Just as peace agreements are ‘brokered’, the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ 
entails an active and exhaustive process of delicate judicial deliberation. As such, regional 
human rights courts are not merely a conduit between global and domestic norms. They should 
be neither a passive receptacle by merely scanning and cataloguing potentially relevant external 
standards nor a pedlar of their own hermetically determined standards. Norm-brokering entails 
‘a dynamic act of congruence-building’.134 Arguably, the goal of norm-brokering is to 
articulate a compelling and finely-judged case for the extension of human rights norms,135 
perhaps aiming for maximal congruency and comity where possible, but not settling for 
straightforward transposition or a bare process of translation between regional and global 
actors. Norm-brokering should function like a ‘thick’ ‘consolidation machine’136 by which, as 
Fred Frohock argues, ‘[i]ndividual entries are to be interpreted and judged, eventually rank 
ordered, and sometimes flatly denied as they pass from the entrances to the exits of the 
machine.’137 
                                                 
131 See, Thakur and Weiss, ‘R2P: From Idea to Norm – and Action’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 22 
at 33-5. 
132 Pattberg, ‘Private Rule Making in Global Environmental Governance’ (2005) 5 International Environmental 
Agreements 175 at 182-3. 
133 The etymology of ‘broker’ in Middle English conjures rather pejorative notions of ‘peddlers and pimps’ or 
individuals who ‘buy and sell public office’. However, there are other more charitable usages – ‘wine dealer’ 
(from the Old French, ‘brochier’, meaning to broach or pierce a keg) and thus ‘retailer’ or ‘middleman’.  See, for 
example, Hoad (ed.), ‘The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology’ (OUP online: 2003) 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780192830982.001.0001/acref-9780192830982-e-
1873?rskey=P0fgHZ&result=1871 [last accessed 3 July 2017].  In mid-14th century Anglo-French, ‘brocour’ 
meant ‘small trader’, and the Portuguese ‘alborcar’ meant ‘barter’ – see: 
http://www.etymonline.com/?term=broker [last accessed 3 July 2017].   
134 Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism’ (2004) 58(2) International Organization 239 at 269. 
135 Suggested in Beeson, ‘Living with Giants: ASEAN and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism’ (2013) 1(2) 
TRaNS: Trans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia 303 at 316 (attributing the term to Katsumata, 
ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum (Palgrave, 2009). 
136 Frohock, supra n 81 at 220. 
137 Ibid. at 221. 
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Our argument broadly is that human rights courts too often simply amass and catalogue in 
an aggregative manner different external norms, without also expressly assessing the 
transferability of those norms (given the contexts within which they emerged). As such, they 
fail to adequately perform the brokering role that we suggest. There is a fine line between 
appropriate judicial humility138 and excessive judicial caution.139 As we have noted, there are 
also clear sensitivities pertaining to overstepping the Court’s subsidiary position. However, we 
suggest that the mere referencing of external norms, without explaining why they ought or 
ought not to obtain purchase, will only further exacerbate a human rights court’s legitimacy 
challenges in the view of states and applicants, rather than strengthening the basis of the 
judgment.  
The development and diffusion of norms across regions has become more pronounced ‘as 
rich and sophisticated bodies of jurisprudence have emerged from the European and Inter-
American systems.’140 To put it differently, the more the global normative environment has 
filled out, the more these Courts can borrow from this rich library. The global multiplication 
of norm-generating bodies undoubtedly offers opportunities for interpretative burden-sharing. 
But it also ‘increases the possibility of clashes … increases uncertainty, ambiguity, 
inconsistencies, gaps and instability’.141 This makes it all the more incumbent on human rights 
courts to engage closely with the normative arguments raised. This means not only drawing on 
external norms where international law is clear, not simply citing external norms to ‘fortify 
adverse decisions against state resistance’,142 not simply transplanting norms from one regional 
system to another, but engaging in norm-brokering principally because this process is an 
exercise of ‘public reason’, focused on improving the intelligibility of judgments and their 
public reception.143 This thesis has further implications for the way in which the role of human 
rights courts – and especially supra-national human rights courts – is conceived. 
 
 
4. HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS AS NORM-BROKERS 
 
Writing six years ago in this journal, Steven Greer and Luzius Wildhaber conceived of two 
alternative conceptual poles: on the one hand, ‘the systematic delivery of individual justice’ 
(‘the attempt by the Convention system to ensure that every genuine victim of a Convention 
violation receives a judgment in their favour’)144 and on the other, a model premised on the 
                                                 
138 See the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Šikuta, Wojtyczek, and Vehabović in Marguš v Croatia (2014), 
supra n 17 at para 132.  
139 See, for example, the accusation of timidity in the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Spielmann, 
Sicilianos and Keller in El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, supra n 33, Joint Concurring 
Opinion of Judges Tulkens, Spielmann, Sicilianos and Keller at para 10: ‘In these circumstances, we consider that 
the judgment’s somewhat timid allusion to the right to the truth in the context of Article 3 and the lack of an 
explicit acknowledgment of this right in relation to Article 13 of the Convention give the impression of a certain 
over-cautiousness.’ 
140 Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 American 
Journal of International Law 38 at 60. 
141 Sadurski, supra n 9 at 2. See also Bjorge, ‘National supreme courts and the development of ECHR rights’ 
(2011) 9(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 5 at 16, arguing that, for States, the Court’s commitment 
to evolutive interpretation means that the normative content and scope of the Convention is a moving target. 
142 Neuman, supra n 72 at 112. 
143 See further, Sadurski, supra n 9141. See also, Waldron, ‘Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism’ (1987) 37 
Philosophical Quarterly 127 at 134 and 149, discussing the liberal ideal that any attempt at social ordering should 
be ‘capable of explaining itself at the tribunal of each person’s understanding.’ 
144 Greer and Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about “constitutionalising” the European Court of Human Rights,’ 
(2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 655 at 664. In its most rigid incarnation, this model affords equal attention 
to each and every complaint ‘…however slight the violation, whatever the bureaucratic cost, whether or not the 
applicant receives compensation or any other tangible remedy, and whatever the likely impact on the state conduct 
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delivery of ‘constitutional justice’, laying emphasis on the ‘constitutional role’ of the European 
Court of Human Rights. With regards the latter, the Court has itself declared the Convention 
to be a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human rights.’145 For 
our purposes, perhaps the most useful understanding of this ‘constitutional’ role is to see the 
Court, through its oversight of High Contracting Parties, as the guardian of the Convention and 
of the institutional framework of the Council of Europe.146 As was stated in the ‘Opinion of the 
Court on the Wise Persons’ Report’, adopted by the Plenary Court on April 2, 2007: 
 
Although [the Court’s] judgments do not, strictly speaking, have erga omnes 
effect all States should take due notice of judgments against other States, 
especially judgments of principle, thereby pre-empting potential findings of 
violations against themselves. 
 
Not only does the distinction between these two models have salience for our proposed norm-
brokering function (which, on the surface at least, tends towards the ‘constitutional’ end of the 
spectrum),147 but the norm-brokering role also highlights the significant interdependence of 
individual and constitutional justice. 
The Strasbourg Court sometimes sidesteps thorny normative disputes because their 
resolution is not strictly necessary for it to reach judgment on the particular facts before it, 
suggesting a prioritization of individual justice over the Court’s constitutional role. The result, 
however, is that in failing to perform the constitutional role and provide normative direction, 
or in giving a normative steer that is equivocal and ambiguous, the Court also compromises the 
subsequent delivery of individual justice.148 We have already seen an example of this normative 
irresolution in the Grand Chamber judgment in Marguš v Croatia which does not sufficiently 
engage with the external materials brought to the Court’s attention so as to clarify the European 
                                                 
or practice in question.’ This corresponds with what Bogdandy and Venzke describe as a ‘settling disputes’ role 
for international courts. See Bogdandy and Venzke, ‘On the Functions of International Courts: An Appraisal in 
Light of Their Burgeoning Public Authority’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 49. 
145 See, for example, Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v Turkey Application Nos 15299/89, 
15300/89 and 15318/89, Commission Decision, 4 March 1991, at para 22; Loizidou v Turkey Application No 
15318/89, Preliminary Objections, 23 March 1995, at para 75. See also de Wet, ‘The Emergence of International 
and Regional Value Systems as a Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 19 
Leiden Journal of International Law 611. By way of contrast, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe has 
expressly cautioned against viewing the ECHR as a ‘European Constitution’ noting that ‘it is difficult to see how 
the Court could become like any existing national constitutional court.’ See, Contribution of the Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe to the Preparation of the Interlaken Ministerial Conference, 18 December 2009, at para 
28, available at http://www.astrid-online.it/static/upload/protected/Secr/Secretary-General---18-December.pdf 
[last accessed 3 July 2017]. 
146 As Article 19 ECHR provides, the Court is designed to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken 
by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto.’ 
147 See similarly, Farahat, ‘Enhancing Constitutional Justice by Using External References: The European Court 
of Human Rights’ Reasoning on the Protection against Expulsion’ (2015) 28 Leiden Journal of International Law 
303-322; See also, de Londras and Dzehtsiarou, supra n 2 at 526. 
148 In De Souza Ribeiro v France Application No 22689/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, Grand Chamber, 13 
December 2012, for example, while the applicant had been able to apply to an Administrative Court, the 
Administrative Court’s role was held not to constitute a ‘genuine intervention’ given the ‘excessively short time’ 
(less than one hour) between his application to the court and his deportation in execution of the removal order (at 
paras 94-5). Notably, the Grand Chamber in De Souza found that the remedy was in violation of Article 13 
‘without prejudice to the issue of its suspensive nature’ (at para 93). The fact that this caveat appears in the 
‘Application of these principles to the present case’ indicates that the Court fully intended to leave its earlier 
normative conclusion (at paras 82-3) firmly intact (so here, the issue is not one of sidestepping the normative 
question but rather the ambiguity of the normative position adopted). 
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Court’s position on amnesties for the benefit of future litigation.149 The case of De Souza 
Ribeiro v France – a case concerning procedural guarantees for undocumented migrants – also 
illustrates the point. The Court stated that ‘it is not imperative, in order for a remedy to be 
effective, that it should have automatic suspensive effect’.150 By framing the Court’s normative 
position here in negative rather than positive terms, the Court failed to clarify the circumstances 
in which a remedy with automatic suspensive effect would be required – a question that, some 
four years later, was ultimately given decisive clarification in Khlaifia and Others v Italy.151 
Similarly, in Valiulienė v Lithuania,152 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s Concurring Opinion 
argues that ‘the majority missed the opportunity to set out a principled reasoning to impute a 
violation of Article 3, and not of Article 8, to the respondent State, preferring once again to 
remain attached to the particular specificities of the case.’153 
In this light, it is tempting to side with the argument advanced by Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque:  
 
… it is through principled reasoning that judicial statements are normative, and 
it is only by being normative that they can be fully intelligible and implemented. 
In their substance, the Court’s judgments and decisions are acts of auctoritas, 
which must avoid a fallacious over-simplification of the factual and legal 
problems raised by the case and resist the easy temptation of convenient 
omissions. Such auctoritas can be exercised only when the judge shies away 
from a one-sided selection of the domestic and international case-law and does 
not turn a blind eye to fundamental scholarly work pertinent to the discussion 
of the case under adjudication.154 
 
However, despite the intuitive appeal of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque’s vision, the Court is 
undoubtedly subject to significant time and resource constraints and does not have the luxury 
of engaging in comprehensive surveys of normative developments or scholarly research. The 
goal is certainly not for judgments to become an encyclopaedic repository, chronicling every 
possible comparable normative position. Nor is it necessary for the Court’s secretariat to 
routinely survey the jurisprudence of international courts – though there may be merit in ever 
more regular dialogue between regional human rights courts, exchanging summaries of key 
normative developments and identifying precisely any points of normative divergence. Our 
thesis is simply that to take norm-brokering seriously implies the need for careful reflection on 
how best to ensure rigour and consistency in meeting these normative challenges. As Armin 
von Bogdandy has argued, international courts should be thought of as ‘multifunctional actors’ 
– not merely ‘settling disputes’, but also involved in ‘the stabilization of normative 
expectations.’155 In this light, where relevant internal or external norms are raised in the course 
                                                 
149 See above at section 3B. In Marguš v Croatia (2014), supra n 17, for example, it was not necessary for the 
Strasbourg Court to resolve the normative question concerning the impermissibility of amnesties in international 
law. However, the Chamber judgment’s seemingly definitive (over)statement of the normative position resulted 
in a highly critical third-party intervention, ultimately leading the Grand Chamber to make a somewhat evasive 
normative concession (at para 139, cited above at n 128).  
150 De Souza Ribeiro v France, supra n 148 at para 83.  
151 Khlaifia and Others v Italy, supra n 33. By way of contrast, see text accompanying note 108 above, discussing 
how the Court’s clarity in Zolotukhin v Russia, supra n 104 laid the normative foundation for three future Chamber 
judgments. 
152 Valiulienė v Lithuania Application No 33234/07, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 26 March 2013. 
153 Ibid. Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque at n 18. 
154 Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania, supra n 33, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque at para 14 (internal references omitted). 
155 Bogdandy and Venzke, supra n 144. 
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of proceedings, human rights courts should at least engage with (rather than merely list) such 
norms by explaining how and why its own position aligns or diverges. Doing so, we suggest, 
will stand to significantly enhance the intelligibility and persuasiveness of judgments, 
addressing to some degree the critique (here, of the European Court of Human Rights) that its 
judgments are ‘somewhat turgid and lengthy with rather a lot of “boiler-plate paragraphs”, and 
… tend to be rather unengaging …’156   
 
A. Norm-brokering as a contribution to Public Reason 
We began this article by noting Jeremy Waldron’s scepticism of strong judicial review. There 
is, however, much in Waldron’s sceptical account with which we broadly agree: where there 
is a purported violation of rights, ‘we must set up a decision-procedure whose operation will 
settle, not reignite, the controversies whose existence called for a decision-procedure in the 
first place.’157 Moreover, Waldron argues that ‘[j]udicialization tends to shift the focus of 
public discussion from the open and comprehensive consideration of reasons to a highly 
formalized and technical processing of texts and interpretive ideas’. It is this inescapable 
legalism of court proceedings and their inherent remove from the deliberative ideal that leads 
Waldron to reject Rawl’s claim that courts are ‘the exemplar of public reason’.158 We accept 
many of the realist critiques that highlight the constraints operating on judges,159 and so we 
accept that human rights courts will inevitably fall short of an abstract ideal of pure deliberation 
– and that their judgments may sometimes involve ‘“rationalizations” rather than the giving of 
reasons.’160  
Where we depart from Waldron, however, is in his rejection of the capacity of courts to 
contribute to ‘public reason’. Waldron argues that courts – because they exclude consideration 
of [some] normatively significant reasons – should not be regarded as ‘reasoning or reason-
giving institutions’161 involved in the ‘unalloyed practice of justification’.162 To the contrary, 
we argue that all the qualities that Waldron ascribes to the Rawlsian ideal of deliberative ‘public 
reason’ – a ‘requirement of openness’,163 ‘real engagement’,164 grappling ‘openly and 
conscientiously’165 with alternative formulations, not ‘holding back in the search for reasons 
that might possibly pertain to the merits of the decision under scrutiny’,166 ‘offering something 
for others to grasp, consider, and engage with’167 – are precisely what human rights courts 
ought diligently to strive for. As such, this article is not making an argument in favour of strong 
judicial review. Ultimately, our claim is a much more modest one focusing on how human 
                                                 
156 Lord Neuberger, President of the UK Supreme Court, ‘Some thoughts on judicial reasoning across 
jurisdictions’, 2016 Mitchell Lecture, Edinburgh, 11 November 2016 at para 27. Available at: 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-161111.pdf [last accessed 3 July 2017]. 
157 Ibid. at 1371. 
158 Rawls, John, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), 224-25. Note that our argument is not 
premised on fidelity to the Rawlsian account. Sadurski also distinguishes his ‘vertical’ (between supranational 
authorities and state entities) concept of supranational public reason from the ‘horizontal’ (between sovereign 
states) account of Rawls. See Sadurski, supra n 9 at 19-20. 
159 Waldron, ‘Public Reason and “Justification” in the Courtroom’ (2007) 1(1) Journal of Law, Philosophy and 
Culture 107-134 at 129 and 132. 
160 Ibid. at 125, citing Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Tudor Publishing Company, 1936) at 102-3. 
161 Ibid. at 129. See also, Waldron, supra n 3 at 1382-1386. 
162 Waldron, supra n 159 at 122. 
163 Ibid. at 121. 
164 Ibid. at 134. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. at 122. 
167 Ibid. at 112. 
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rights courts can best enhance the protection that they afford to fundamental rights and 
simultaneously – without contradiction168 – deepen their claim to legitimacy.  
In defending the human rights project, some scholars have sought primarily to rebut 
arguments that supranational authorities lack democratic legitimacy,169 for example, by making 
the argument that human rights courts are merely tasked with clarifying the scope and 
substance of abstract provisions in what are ‘democratically approved’ human rights texts.170 
However, since this ‘tethering’ of evolutive interpretation to original (democratic) consent is 
‘sometimes tenuous’,171  ‘public reason’ provides a more sure foundation upon which to build 
the case for the legitimacy of human rights.172  
As we have argued, norm-brokering can contribute to what Wojciech Sadurski has called 
the essential ‘public reason’ aspect of legitimacy.173 In Sadurski’s view, the legitimacy of 
(especially supra-national) legal institutions is directly supported by the degree to which they 
explain their adopted reasoning since ‘publicly admissible reasons confer legitimacy upon 
decisions.’174 As such, a key rationale for the norm-brokering role proposed here is that it 
enhances the legitimacy of regional human rights courts, remembering that these courts occupy 
a ‘front-line’ position175 yet also face significant pushback from national governments in light 
of their subsidiary status. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION: NORM-BROKERING AND JURIDICAL METHODOLOGY 
 
Our argument, in summary, is that the concept of ‘norm-brokering’ usefully captures what 
ought to be regarded as a core role of human rights courts. Our case study of the references to 
the Inter-American system in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and 
the adopted argumentation or lack thereof has sought to illustrate this. The 70 Strasbourg 
judgments between 2007-16 that contained some reference to the Inter-American human rights 
system revealed that a range of acutely difficult normative challenges confront such courts. 
The issues range from ‘missed opportunity cases’ (where further normative reasoning could 
have been adduced) to the acute methodological problems of both demonstrating normative 
‘consensus’ amongst Council of Europe Member States and appropriately reflecting external 
normative developments (especially where these too lack certainty).  
We noted that the Rules of Court are silent in relation to both methodological questions. In 
this light, it could be argued that the Rules should be amended so as to specifically address 
such questions of juridical methodology. However, we prefer the view that revision of the 
Rules is unlikely in itself to be a panacea. The Court has already shown that it can undertake a 
norm-brokering role – in instances, for example, where other international treaties contain 
similar but differently worded provisions or where the Court expressly addresses the 
desirability of harmonization. Since these approaches to norm-brokering were not driven by 
                                                 
168 Cf. Waldron’s suggestion, supra n 3 at 1383-4, that reason-giving to enhance the protection of rights and reason-
giving (instrumentally) to enhance court legitimacy are often at cross-purposes. 
169 See, for example, Mayerfeld, supra n 111 at 186-216. 
170 O’Cinneide, supra n 7 at 46. 
171 De Londras and Dzehtsiarou, supra n 2 at 544. 
172 Indeed, Sadurski argues that legitimacy should be uncoupled from democracy-based arguments altogether, 
supra n 9 at 15 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. at 12. 
175 Harmsen, ‘The European Convention of Human Rights after Enlargement’ (2001) 5(4) International Journal 
of Human Rights 18 at 29. 
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adherence to rules, we suggest that what is critical is the ethos underlying the Court’s 
approach.176  
Ultimately, this ethos should not be one of ‘relaxed promiscuity’177 in relation to the 
accommodation of external norms (in the sense that Waldron notes: ‘Sure, fine, bring them all 
on’). Rather, there is a need to bring greater methodological rigour to the norm-brokering role. 
Norm-brokering demands that human rights courts should, at a minimum, expressly address 
and carefully reflect upon the question of harmonization. This can be done without 
automatically striving for harmonization as a goal. Norm-brokering entails explicit engagement 
with, rather than mere reference to, external norms. This engagement ought to include a number 
of elements. For the Strasbourg Court, the first is a purely internal question: Is there a clear and 
established line of Strasbourg authority? In cases of conflicting Strasbourg authorities, an 
external norm may assist in their reconciliation. A second question then is whether internal and 
external norms are entirely congruent, so that reference to the external norm would be merely 
iterative, i.e. solely for the purpose of noting the existence of an international consensus. 
Arguably, the legitimacy gains of cataloguing congruent norms are relatively slight when 
contrasted with cases where the external and internal norms are widely divergent. Such 
divergence points to a dissensus which must be explained and grappled with. Thus, if internal 
and external norms diverge, it could thirdly be asked what level of reconciliation is desirable. 
In that latter context, it matters whether there are relevant contextual differences. In a parallel 
exercise of internal norm-brokering, the existence or lack of a European consensus may also 
raise subsidiarity-related considerations in the shape of a wider margin of appreciation (but 
here again, there are important methodological issues for the Strasbourg Court to consider in 
terms of both triggering and interpreting studies which examine levels of consensus). 
Addressing these different questions should not turn the norm-developing role into one of 
academic inquiry. However, even if external norms are not critically decisive for the case at 
hand, explaining why this is so can help strengthen the normative basis of a judgment, thereby 
contributing to ‘public reason’ and increasing a court’s legitimacy in the eyes of both States 
and applicants. In terms of the Strasbourg Court specifically, taking this implicit norm-
brokering role more seriously will, as we have argued, enhance both its constitutional standing 
and the delivery of individual justice. 
 
 
                                                 
176 McCrudden makes a similar point in relation to domestic courts, supra n 7 at 515. 
177 Waldron, supra n 159 at 117. 
